Direct democracy has emerged as a central part of American state and local government in the 21st century. The initiative and referendum are available in more than half of all states and cities now and over 70 percent of citizens have access to them at the state or local level. Yet direct democracy still attracts its share of critics, who raise questions ranging from whether voters are competent to decide complex policy questions to how it affects minority rights. The underlying concern is whether direct democracy leads to better or worse public policy. While opinions abound, rigorous empirical evidence on how direct democracy affects policy outputs is in short supply.
1
One of the more prominent criticisms recently is that initiatives place too many constraints on elected officials when it comes to budgeting. The initiative and referendum have long been used to tie the hands of legislators through tax and expenditure limitations, referendum requirements on debt issues and tax increases, earmarking of funds to specific purposes, establishment of sin taxes and state lotteries, and so on. The fear is that by locking in so much spending and also restricting tax increases initiatives may take too many decisions out of the hands of elected officials, making it difficult to balance the budget, and bringing about fiscal gridlock. Does direct democracy really make it too difficult for officials to balance public sector budgets? To shed light on this question, I present a case study of the affect of initiatives on the state budget in California, where it is widely believed that initiatives have paralyzed the budget process. In early 2003 California faced a projected budget deficit for the oncoming fiscal year in the vicinity of $30 billion.
2 This staggering shortfall fueled the recall campaign that removed the incumbent governor, Gray Davis, from office, and installed Arnold Schwarzenegger in his place. However, many observers blamed the budget crisis not on the governor but on the voters themselves. They asserted that a series of popular initiatives had locked in spending while preventing tax increases, making it impossible for the governor and legislature to make rational decisions (Table   1 ). These pundits were giving voice to a concern that had emerged among some scholars in the previous decade (Cain and Noll, 1995) .
<TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE>
The danger of initiatives bringing about fiscal gridlock is especially acute in California where a successful ballot measure can only be repealed or amended by a direct vote of the people. All other states allow the legislature to amendment initiatives after a period of time (Matsusaka 2004) . If initiatives were to blame for the budget crisis in California, it would raise some troubling questions about direct democracy in general. 3 Yet the assertion that initiatives have paralyzed the budget seems to be based on an impressionistic view of the measures approved by the voters; I am not aware of any systematic study of the extent to which the budget process is constrained by voter initiatives.
My purpose here is to provide, I believe for the first time, a systematic accounting 
Initiatives in California
The initiative allows ordinary citizens to propose laws and constitutional amendments by collecting a predetermined number of signatures from fellow citizens on a petition. When the requisite signatures are collected, the measure is placed on the ballot and becomes law if more votes are cast in favor of it than against it. Initiatives are different from propositions placed on the ballot by the legislature. I will focus on initiatives in this article since they are the main source of controversy.
The initiative is common in the United States. Twenty-four of 50 states and about half of all cities make it available. Fully 71 percent of the population lives in either a state or a city where the initiative is available. The initiative is quite an old institution. It was first adopted by South Dakota in 1898, giving it a more venerable pedigree than universal women's suffrage, the federal income tax, and social security.
In most respects, California's initiative process is similar to that of other states (Matsusaka, 2004 
Constraints on Spending
Constraints can take many forms. Expenditure can be locked in ("spend at least $1 million on education") or capped ("spend no more than $1 million on education"). Limits can be fixed ("spend at least $1 million on education") or conditional ("spend at least 1 percent of the budget on education" or "spend at least $1 million on education except during a recession year"). Restrictions can be absolute ("spend $1 million on education") or flexible ("spend $1 million on education unless the legislature decides otherwise by a 3/5 vote"). I concentrate on constraints that might make it difficult to balance the budget, that is, appropriations that cannot be reduced and revenue sources that cannot be tapped or increased. I only examine constraints imposed by voter initiatives. The budget is constrained by other factors, such as federal and state constitutional provision and federal mandates; I will discuss these other constraints after describing those originating from initiatives.
Constraints also vary over time. (adjusted for inflation) even though courts have weakened that initiative, making the actual costs much lower than anticipated. Because I report the largest plausible amounts, the final numbers likely to overstate the true constraints from these initiatives. 6 Details of the assessments are in the appendix. 
<TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE>
In total, these initiatives locked in $32.132 billion in state spending for the 2003-04 fiscal year. As noted above, this probably overstates the amount of money committed by initiatives. To put the figure in perspective, total state appropriations for the fiscal year were $101 billion. Thus, voter initiatives locked in about 32 percent of the budget. 8 The claim that 70 percent of the budget was earmarked in advance by initiatives (see Table 1) is far off the mark. Proposition 98. 10 If so, the overall spending commitment from initiatives would be no more than 16 percent of the budget.
Whether 32 percent (or 16 percent) is a big or small number is in the eye of the beholder. It is clear that these initiatives did impose material constraints on California's spending priorities. However, constraints of this magnitude, in themselves, are unlikely to create a sizeable budget deficit, especially since (as will be seen in the next section) initiatives do not significantly prohibit tax increases.
The evidence challenges the paralysis view in another way. While some commentators paint a picture of the California budget collapsing under the weight of a flurry of initiatives, Table 2 shows that the problem (if it is a problem) is almost entirely the result of a single initiative, Proposition 98. Without Proposition 98, only 2 percent of the budget is locked in by initiatives, a small number in anyone's book. It seems unfair to issue a blanket condemnation of the initiative process based on essentially a single outcome, especially since every political process (including the legislative) is inherently imperfect and liable to make mistakes from time to time.
Constraints on Revenue
A deficit can be closed by cutting spending or raising revenue (or some combination of the two). We have seen that with the exception of Proposition 98, voter initiatives placed few constraints on the California legislature's ability to cut spending in 2003-04. Yet even if 100 percent of spending was locked in by initiatives, a deficit could be avoided if sufficient revenue was available. Consider now the limits on raising revenue that arise from initiatives. mostly from charges for services and user fees).
<TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE>
As can be seen, initiatives created no barriers to raising the California personal income tax (other than a requirement that rates be indexed) and only a modest constraint on raising the state sales tax (it cannot be applied to food), by far the two most important revenue sources for state governments. In fact, the five most important revenue sources were essentially unconstrained by voter initiatives. Two of the constraints actually increased revenue: alcohol and tobacco taxes, the sixth most important revenue source, were set at a minimum of 75 cents a pack, and Proposition 37 (1984) mandated a state lottery, creating a revenue source.
Initiatives imposed two major obstacles to tax increases. Proposition 13 (1978) set the maximum property tax rate at 1 percent of assessed value and limited assessment increases, and Proposition 6 (1982) essentially eliminated death and gift taxes. However, these taxes are relatively unimportant sources of revenue for state governments.
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The central message of Table 3 is even clearer than that of 
What about Proposition 13?
Proposition 13 is often mentioned as a prime culprit for California's fiscal problems (Schrag, 2004 ), yet it hardly figures in the preceding calculations. The reason is that the proposition does not dedicate any funding so it does not appear in Table 2 , and its restrictions apply only to the property tax, which is not an important revenue source at the state level.
While accurate, this paints a misleading picture of Proposition 13's impact. After
Proposition 13 cut local (primarily county) property tax revenue by about half, the state stepped in and made up most of the difference for several years. Thus, Proposition 13 indirectly drove up state expenditures, initially by about the amount of the property tax shortfall it caused.
One way to factor these indirect effects of Proposition 13 into the preceding estimates would be to calculate the amount of this property tax backfill and count it as another expenditure that the state is required to make (that is, add the amount to 
What about Legislative Measures?
The California budget is also constrained by propositions placed on the ballot by the legislature. Most states require legislatures to obtain voter approval for certain actions, such as constitutional amendments or bond issues. To get a sense of the magnitude of the constraints imposed by legislative measures, I reviewed all such measures that were approved since 1990 and identified the ones with a fiscal impact. The most important were measures that authorized a bond issue for a specific purpose. Bond issues commit the state to appropriate funds to service the debt. As of July 2003, the total general obligation debt for the state was $27.6 billion. The estimated debt service for
2003-04 was $2.6 billion (see Appendix). If we subtract the $181 million of this that
arose from initiative bonds, we end up with a sum of about $2.4 billion that was earmarked for debt service by legislative bonds. This is not a small amount, but it does not change the basic picture of the overall size of the direct democracy-based constraints facing the governor and legislature. Other than bond issues, I found no legislative measures that committed sizable funds or inhibited revenue increases. Tables 2 and 3 Except for two taxes that are relatively unimportant for state governments, on property and inheritance, initiatives placed no material constraints on the raising of revenue.
Discussion
Whether 32 percent is a big or small number is open to debate, but it is quite a bit smaller than some pundits have claimed (Table 1) . In any event, to hold initiatives accountable for a budget deficit, they must prevent the legislature from cutting spending and from raising revenue. Unless both constraints are binding, the legislature has room to close a deficit if it has the political will to do so. The evidence indicates that both constraints are not binding in California. Initiatives have removed some of the legislature's discretion, but as a whole they do not stand in the way of balancing the budget. 16 Thus, the facts do not support the claim that initiatives caused the 2003-04 California budget crisis.
17
The evidence here only pertains to constraints arising from citizen initiatives.
California's budget crisis may have been caused by noninitiative constraints. State spending is restricted by the U.S. Constitution (for example, prison spending can only be cut so much before prison conditions will run afoul of the constitutional prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment) and the California Constitution (for example, the California Supreme Court has limited the state's ability to refuse to pay for abortions for
MediCal recipients on constitutional grounds). Federal mandates and obligations created
by previous actions of the legislature may also have reduced the legislature's room to maneuver.
The evidence also does not speak to the possibility that the threat of initiatives might influence budget decisions in the legislature. Few politicians want to be seen as flaunting the expressed will of the people or to trigger a new initiative. Politicians may end up feeling constrained by the threat of initiatives as much as by the measures that have been adopted (Gerber, 1996) . While the initiative certainly can affect policy even without a measure on the ballot, there is no systematic evidence that initiative threats prevent responsible budgeting. In fact, budget practices appear no less coherent when the voters participate directly than when politicians make all the decisions. Initiative states are no more or less inclined to borrow than noninitiative states, all else equal, they cut spending and taxes in a way that keeps budgets balanced (Matsusaka, 1995 (Matsusaka, , 2004 , and mandatory referendums on debt issues have modest effects on the amount of debt outstanding (Kiewiet and Szakaly, 1996) .
18
In short, this case study of California reveals that initiatives did not cause the state's budget crisis in 2003-04. This finding reinforces the conclusion of studies using aggregate data that initiatives do not bring about irrationally short-sighted budget policies. Voters have used initiatives to establish spending priorities and restrict the way money is raised, but these constraints have not paralyzed the California budget. Pundits have blamed the initiative for the state's budgetary woes, but the initiative seems to be a scapegoat for the inability of California's elected officials to manage the competing demands for public funds in a period of declining revenues.
Proposition 97 (1988) -Cal/OSHA
The measure required the state to maintain its own Occupational Safety and Hazard (OSHA) program. The number in Table 2 
Proposition 98 (1988) --Education
The measure guaranteed minimum state spending for K-14 education. total; it appears as part of the total for Proposition 117.
Proposition 103 (1988) -Auto insurance
The measure regulated automobile insurance rates. The number in Table 2 is the Legislative Analyst's upper bound estimate for state administrative costs adjusted for inflation since 1988.
Proposition 116 (1990) -Rail bonds
The measure authorized $1.99 billion in bonds for rail transportation. The number in Table 2 
Proposition 132 (1990) -Gill net ban
The measured banned the use of gill nets off the coast of Southern California. The number is the Legislative Analyst's estimated cost of enforcing the ban adjusted for inflation since 1990.
Proposition 184 (1994) -Three strikes
The measure toughened sentences on repeat offenders. The number is 10 percent of the Legislative Analyst's estimate in 1994. The original spending projections by the RAND Corporation that were used by the Legislative Analyst were predicated on universal application of the law. However, the California Supreme Court subsequently gave judges significant leeway to ignore the initiative, and the original estimates turned out to be much too high. A RAND study some years after the initiative passed noted that there is no evidence that any of the projected costs actually materialized (Greenwood et al., 1998) . The RAND study argues for assigning no net costs to the measure, but I (rather arbitrarily) assume the true number is 10 percent of the Legislative Analyst's estimate of $3 billion per year. In real terms, state spending on corrections has increased by just under $1 billion since 1994. My estimates assume that Proposition 184 and 21 in 2000 alone required the state to spend ad additional $728 million, almost surely an overestimate of their impact.
Proposition 10 (1998) -Early childhood development
The measure increased the tax on tobacco products by 50 cent a pack, and dedicated the money to a variety of uses, chief among them early childhood development programs.
The initiative locks in spending equal to the amount raised from the tobacco surtax for the California Children and Families First Trust Fund. I followed the revenue estimate in the governor's budget proposal of January 2003.
Proposition 21 (2000) -Juvenile crime
The measure toughened sentences for juvenile offenders. The number in Table 2 For example, the number of juveniles serving time as adults declined after the measure passed so this number is likely to be an overestimate of the measure's true cost.
Proposition 36 (2000) -Drug treatment
The measure required probation and treatment for drug consumers rather than 
Proposition 50 (2002) -Water projects bonds
The measure authorized $3.44 billion of bonds for water projects. The number in Table 2 is 0.1 of the $74 million of outstanding bonds, an estimate of the required debt service for (Gerber et al., 2001) .
17. Whether the spending and financing priorities established by initiatives are wise --a question that I consider primarily a matter of opinion and preference --is a different issue entirely.
18. There is evidence, however, that fiscal constraints affect the cost of borrowing as spending and borrowing limits tend to reduce interest rates while tax limits tend to increase interest rates (Poterba and Rueben, 1999) . The net effect of these constraints on California in 2003-04 is unclear. 
